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Much of the controversy about methods for automated decision making has focused on specific 
calculi for combining beliefs or propagating uncertainty. We broaden the debate by (1) exploring 
the constellation of secondary tasks surrounding any primary decision problem, and (2) identify­
ing knowledge engineering concerns that present additional representational tradeoffs. We argue 
on pragmatic grounds that the attempt to support all of these tasks within a single calculus is 
misguided. In the process, we note several uncertain reasoning objectives that conflict with the 
Bayesian ideal of complete specification of probabilities and utilities. In response, we advocate 
treating the uncertainty calculus a.s an object language for reasoning mechanisms that support the 
secondary tasks. Arguments against Bayesian decision theory are weakened when the calculus is 
relegated to this role. Architectures for uncertainty handling that take statements in the calculus 
a.s objects to be reasoned about offer the prospect of retaining normative status with respect to 
decision making while supporting the other tasks in uncertain reasoning. 
1 Introduction 
Much of the controversy surrounding the use of un­
certainty calculi in AI can be explained by a differ­
ence in the emphasis the competing approaches place 
on the various tasks faced by the problem-solver. In 
this essay, we argue that comparisons of competing 
uncertainty mechanisms in the context of any sin­
gle task do not clarify the debate and further, that 
the attempt to completely describe the aspects of 
uncertainty necessary to support all of these tasks 
within a single "calculus" is misguided. Instead, we 
believe that the important advances in technology 
for building computer programs that reason under 
uncertainty will be achieved via knowledge represen;.. 
tations that serve computational requirements nor­
mally considered beyond the realm of belief combi­
nation and decision making formalisms. 1 
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1 It is difficult to separate precisely the uncertainty "cal­
culi" from "non-calculus" uncertainty representation mecha­
nisms. Loosely speaking, we take calculi to be representa­
tions that directly attach some kind of "measure of belief" 
to proposition-like objects and provide a small set of com­
bination rules for deriving belief measures for aggregations 
and transformations of the basic objects. Bayesian probabil­
ities [12], Dempster-Shaler (D-S) belief functions [41], MYCIN 
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We are driven to this view by the observation that 
knowledge engineering issues that arise in assembling 
and utilizing a knowledge base built on any uncer­
tainty mechanism are not practically subject to the 
normative interpretations of calculus elements that 
may hold within the knowledge base. Such engineer­
ing concerns-perhaps not necessarily but always in 
practice--fall "outside the model." Therefore, argu­
ments based only on properties of the calculus within 
the model cannot be conclusive. 
These motivations resemble Shafer's well-stated 
arguments for "constructive probability" (42,44]. 
However, where Shafer concludes that constructive 
issues should guide comparison of calculi, we focus 
on the implications on representations and mecha­
nisms supporting uncertain reasoning tasks. 
2 Uncertain Reasoning Tasks 
For concreteness, our analysis focuses on a mythi­
cal program for reasoning about medical problems, 
which we shall call the robot physician. Though we 
do not propose that technology of the near future will 
permit us to build a program comparable to humans 
in all respects, the demands of such a broad domain 
dictate strong design constraints on mechanisms for 
uncertain reasoning. 
We start by putting ourselves in the place of a 
knowledge engineer embarking on the design of this 
certainty factors [45], and fuzzy possibility [54], for example, 
are well-known uncertainty representations that fall easily into 
the category of calculi. 
robot physician. In the sections below, we discuss 
specific tasks that arise in uncertain reasoning to il­
lustrate more forcefully the different representational 
issues that a knowledge engineer would face. We will 
see that no scheme yet presented is ideal for all of 
these tasks, and it is unrealistic to expect that any 
''framework" describable as an incremental extension 
to a calculus would be. 
2.1 The One-Shot Decision 
The basic task is one we call the "one-shot decision," 
which corresponds to the usual decision-theoretic for­
mulation of a choice problem. 
In the one-shot decision, the physician is required 
to choose from a set of alternate acts (for example, 
strategies involving combinations of diagnostic tests 
and drug therapies). To account for uncertainty, we 
postulate a state of nature that is unknown to the 
decision-maker (perhaps the identity and other fea­
tures of the patient's disease) but is taken to be one of 
a set of possible states. The outcome of the decision 
(the resulting health and well-being of the patient) 
is determined by the actual state of nature and the 
chosen action. 
A Bayesian decision-maker has a utility function 
over outcomes and a probability distribution over 
states of nature, and chooses the action that maxi­
mizes expected utility. In designing a robot physi­
cian for particular one-shot decisions, we can en­
sure that it is Bayesian by explicitly encoding its 
knowledge in the form of these objects-action sets, 
states of nature sets, utility functions, and proba­
bility distributions-using notations similar to those 
developed by decision analysts [29,37,40]. Indeed, 
given desiderata for belief measures and "rational de­
cision making" [11,39], Bayesians can make a strong 
case for decision models as uniquely valid knowledge 
representations. Any weaker body of assertions may 
not justify a choice of action, and any additional in­
formation must be superfluous with respect to the 
decision. 
Even those accepting the Bayesian arguments re­
garding the normative status of decision theory are 
free to reject the use of decision-theoretic models as 
a knowledge representation on pragmatic knowledge 
engineering grounds [50]. We consider this position 
in Section 3. 
The pure one-shot decision scenario is an ideal­
ization that is only defensible in extremely time­
constrained, highly-specialized situations in which a 
decision model must be pre-fabricated, perhaps in a 
hospital emergency room or during a surgical oper-
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ation. More generally, a decision is embedded in a 
situation calling for additional reasoning capabilities. 
2.2 Information Gathering 
Once we relax the time constraint, our robot physi­
cian has several options in addition to the primary 
decision. 
Acquire more knowledge or information. The 
robot physician may benefit from reading journal 
articles, exploring patient databases, or finding out 
more about the patient before making the decision 
in question. While information-gathering actions 
that possibly have serious medical consequences­
invasive tests such as biopsies, for example-are of­
ten explicitly considered as part of the decision, rela­
tively inexpensive steps like asking the patient ques­
tions are usually outside any formal decision model. 
Wait for uncertain events to resolve. Sometimes 
valuable information can be obtained simply by wait­
ing to see how things turn out. Because the benefits 
of a "wait" strategy are largely computational (we 
avoid planning for some contingencies that do not 
obtain anyway), incorporating this option within the 
primary decision model is technically difficult. 
Ask other physicians for advice. The robot physi­
cian's colleagues (human or machine) may be bet­
ter suited for this decision or might complement the 
robot's own expertise. The communication skills 
necessary for this strategy form an important class of 
reasoning tasks in their own right, and are discussed 
further in Section 2.3. 
Design and perform experiments. In treating pa­
tients, information-gathering is typically limited to 
direct data acquisition or observing the results of pre­
established experiments such as cell cultures. How­
ever, designing experiments (or at least somewhat 
modifying existing procedures) is always a real op­
tion to a decision-maker. For a robot research physi­
cian, experimentation would be a primary activity. 
To take advantage of this more active form of knowl­
edge acquisition, the robot needs to understand the 
relationship between the uncertainty in its decision 
problem and other uncertainties that it can test in 
the world. 
To perform any of these tasks-and even to se­
lect which of these avenues to pursue-our robot 
will need a very rich description of the state and 
nature of uncertainties involved in its decision envi­
ronment. The knowledge prerequisites for effective 
information-gathering go well beyond the require­
ments for modeling the primary decision itself. 
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2.3 Communication 
As mentioned above, one of the options open to our 
robot physician is to seek the advice of a human or 
machine colleague. Let us consider the communi­
cation tasks faced by two types of physician in this 
situation: a generalist and a specialist, either or both 
of which might be machines. For simplicity, we will 
assume the generalist is the decision maker or has 
direct access to the decision maker's preferences. 
In a simple interaction, the generalist might con­
sult a specialist dedicated to a particular decision 
problem. The model for the decision, including al­
ternate acts, relevant events, outcomes, and proba­
bilities, are as8umed to be explicitly encoded in the 
knowledge base of this super-specialist. In such a 
situation, the generalist needs only communicate to 
the super-specialist the patient-specific details of the 
problem such as the patient's symptoms and �ref­
erences. The specialist then computes the optimal 
strategy using the calculus of decision theory and re­
ports the result to the generalist. If an explanation 
is desired, the super-specialist could display to the 
generalist the sensitive portions of the model along 
with any needed discussion of decision theory. 
In a more complex interaction between general­
ist and specialist, the generalist cannot assume that 
the specialist has a pre-existing decision model and 
therefore must present an accurate account of the de­
cision problem to the expert. The consult-requesting 
generalist cannot in practice describe all of its in­
formation relevant to the problem; instead, it must 
choose appropriate levels of abstraction at which to 
convey its knowledge. For example, rather than 'pre­
senting its consultant with a photographic image 
of the patient's retina, it might simply report that 
the fundascopic examination was "normal." In this 
communication task, the generalist must balance the 
costs of precise communication with the benefits of 
avoiding misinterpretation. 
In reacting to this description, a specialist consul­
tant must construct a model from the problem de­
scription and its "background knowledge." In doing 
so, it may identify or synthesize additional strate­
gies not considered by the generalist, select state 
variables relevant to the problem, and characterize 
probabilistic relationships among the variables and 
strategies. Model construction issues are discussed 
further in Section 3.1. 
Once the model is constructed, the robot specialist 
must present and possibly explain the implications of 
the model to the generalist. In many cases, a sim­
ple explanation like the one described above may be 
sufficient. Often, however, the generalist may not ac-
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cept one or more components of the model adopted 
by the specialist. For example, the specialist's prob­
abilities for uncertain events in the model may be 
different from those of the generalist and a discrep­
ancy may still exist after the generalist hears the 
specialist state its beliefs. In thi� case, the s�ecial�st 
is faced with a complex explanatiOn task: to Identify 
and present pieces of knowledge to the consulting 
generalist that will convince it of the validity of the 
specialist's beliefs. We will refer to this complex ex­
planation task as justification, recognizing that oth­
ers have used this term to denote broader or some­
what different explanation activities. 
Finding the optimal amount of knowledge and the 
level of abstraction at which to present it is a highly 
complex task. If too little or excessively abstract 
knowledge is conveyed, the physician will not be con­
vinced. If too much or excessively fine-grained infor­
mation is given, the physician will find the specialist 
a waste of time. 
Most importantly, the information provided by the 
specialist should be a function of the knowledge or 
lack of knowledge of the agent seeking consultation. 
Knowledge valuable to one agent may be worthless 
to another. 
This facet of justification has received some atten­
tion by artificial intelligence researchers under the 
name of user-modeling [46]. Knowledge representa­
tions consisting primarily of an uncertainty calculus 
(as employed by statistical diagnostic aids [1,25,49]) 
provide virtually no support for this task. While 
the volume of representation research in both uncer­
tainty and epistemology has been great (enough to 
merit sizable conferences [20,27]), their intersection 
has been slight. 
In discussing justification, we have assumed that 
the specialist's knowledge relevant to the decision 
problem is a superset of the generalist's knowledge. 
If this is not the case, the robot specialist or, more 
appropriately, the robot colleague, faces the task of 
trying to discover the information held by the consult 
requester that it does not currently possess. Simi­
larly, the requester must try to pinpoint this infor­
mation and present it to its colleague. In such a 
situation, our robots are faced with the extremely 
complex task of constructive debate. 
2.4 Diversity of Reasoning Tasks: 
Discussion 
Others have noted that different tasks may call for 
different uncertainty mechanisms [4]. In enumerating 
the reasoning tasks above, we emphasized the multi-
plicity of requirements the various tasks impose on a 
representation scheme for uncertain knowledge. Be­
cause of the additional tasks surrounding any central 
choice problem, the decision model complete for the 
one-shot decision is no longer adequate. Compet­
ing knowledge representation mechanisms must be 
evaluated on their support for these other tasks. As 
we argue below, performance on these tasks is de­
termined by structural and computational issues­
not by selection of an underlying uncertainty calcu­
lus afone. 
3 Knowledge Engineering Is­
sues 
The enumeration of tasks above demonstrated that 
the knowledge sufficient to make a one-shot decision 
does not necessarily support other, equally necessary, 
reasoning tasks. In this section, we present addi­
tional grounds for considering extra-calculitic issues 
even within the one-shot decision scenario. These 
arguments rule out the formulation of information­
gathering and communication into a more general 
decision-making problem as an antidote for our task 
diversity conclusions. 
A solution to the problem of building a robot 
physician must be sensitive to issues concerning the 
assembly of the robot's knowledge by its human 
designers. The knowledge representations that are 
best with respect to decision-making performance 
and computational efficiency may not be optimal 
or even feasible when it comes to knowledge engi­
neering. The sections below provide several rea­
sons that knowledge encoded in other forms might 
be preferable, and identify representational issues 
salient for computerized decision-making from non­
decision-analytic knowledge bases. 
3.1 Model Construction 
In the discussion of reasoning tasks above (Sec­
tion 2), we started with a representation oriented to­
ward a primary decision and showed that this model 
failed to support the surrounding reasoning tasks. 
Here we start with a knowledge base not necessar­
ily in the form of a decision model and consider the 
problem of formulating a model for the primary de­
cision from this representation. 
A decision model is suitable as a knowledge base 
only for the most specialized of robot physicians. A 
model covering more than a very narrow body of de­
cision contexts is a poor one for any particular med-
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ical problem because the extraneous features con­
sidered tend to entail an unnecessary information­
gathering burden and to obscure explanations of the 
result. General models cannot take advantage of sim­
plifying features that-while present in any given de­
cision problem-vary from case to case. In fact, we 
are aware of no decision-analytic models in medicine 
applicable outside of a narrowly-defined class of pa­
tient cases. This limitation is not restricted to deci­
sion analysis technology, however; AI-style medical 
expert systems that generate treatment recommen­
dations have invariably been super-specialists. 2 
One approach toward overcoming the apparent un­
scalability of decision models is to build a knowledge 
base in some other form and endeavor to customize a 
decision model for each given problem instance. Un­
fortunately, we have to be rather vague about these 
"other forms" of knowledge representation because 
efforts to build large knowledge bases in AI projects 
to date have met with only mixed success. Never­
theless, we cite below several features of AI tech­
niques which can undoubtedly enhance the extensi­
bility of existing computational mechanisms for de­
cision modeling. 
Broadly speaking, decision models and therefore 
the task of constructing them can be partitioned into 
three components: 
• generating possible strategies, 
• identifying relevant variables, and 
• assignment of beliefs and preferences. 
The target representation for a decision-model con­
structor must have objects corresponding to the 
strategies, events, probabilities, and utilities pro­
duced by these component tasks. Note that the 
decision-model formalisms cited above may be suit­
able target representations despite their inadequacy 
for general knowledge representation in the robot. 
The potential advantages of alternate knowledge 
representations lie in the possibility of implicitly cap­
turing an enormous variety of decision models in a 
relatively compact encoding. For example, in tradi­
tional AI planning,3 the set of strategies is implicitly 
represented by a description of the action types and 
2To verify these assertions, see Kassirer et al. [28] for a 
review of medical decision analysis applications. The papers 
collected by Clancey and Shortliffe [8] provide a perspective 
on the state-of-the-art of decision-making in knowledge-based 
systems for medicine. Rennels et al. [38] analyze some of the 
choice mechanisms applied in these systems. 
3See Charniak and McDermott for an overview of AI 
work in planning [5]. Wellman [52] recasts the AI planning 
paradigm in a framework compatible with decision theory. 
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a set of combination rules. Thus, we can specify the 
strategies open to our robot physician by describ­
ing the individual actions that it can prescribe (var­
ious drugs and their dosage ranges, diagnostic tests, 
and surgical procedures, for example) along with an 
account of how they can be sequenced, conditional­
ized, or otherwise combined into complete therapy 
plans. ONYX, a planning architecture developed by 
Langlotz et al. [30], combines knowledge represented 
in this form with patient-specific data to generate a 
reasonable number of plans to consider for a partic­
ular case. The best strategy is then identified via 
a decision-analytic evaluation model. In contrast, a 
direct decision model representation would have to 
enumerate the complete therapy plans in advance. 
Outside of extraordinarily narrow decision contexts, 
supplying such an exhaustive list would not be fea­
sible. 
Likewise, the set of possible events to include in 
the target decision model may be combinatorial in 
some more primitive type of element, for example 
if events can be described as patterns of sub-events 
over time. Or perhaps variations on events are de­
scribable by combinations of lower-level features. If 
so, a terminological knowledge representation facility 
(exemplified by KL-ONE [3]) would allow the knowl­
edge engineer to describe structural relations among 
features, leaving instantiation of precise feature com­
binations (an exponential number of possibilities) to 
the requirements of a particular problem instance. In 
either case, the static decision model form of knowl­
edge representation fails to take advantage of struc­
tural regularity because it requires that the most de­
tailed descriptions of events explicitly appear at the 
surface of the knowledge base. 
Many of these advantages may be achieved at 
least in part by incremental enhancements to exist­
ing decision-model computational tools. Regardless 
of implementation perspective, the knowledge engi­
neering benefits accrue from the adoption of knowl­
edge representations separate from the decision mod­
els produced for the final analysis. 
3.2 Knowledge Modification 
An important concern for the representation of 
knowledge is the ease with which a representation 
can be modified. In real-world applications, a knowl­
edge base that is difficult to modify soon becomes 
obsolete. The key characteristic of a representation 
when it comes to modifying the knowledge base is 
modularity. Modularity is an engineering concern 
for any knowledge-based system; under uncertainty 
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the problem is magnified by the sensitivity of prob­
abilistic relations to surrounding context [23). 
To illustrate the modularity problems that arise 
in probabilistic knowledge representations, we ad­
duce an example from Cooper's NESTOR [10] that 
was used by Spiegelhalter [48] for another· purpose. 
NESTOR's domain is hypercalcemia, hence the pro­
gram includes a knowledge base relating a patient's 
calcium level to other physiological states and asso­
ciated findings. In Spiegelhalter's model fragment, 
the unconditional or prior probability of coma is .05. 
To us non-specialists this value seems high; a much 
lower fraction of people we know are comatose. Of 
course, the number may be valid for the population 
treated by the program: patients identified somehow 
for a hypercalcemia work-up. 
The point is that the knowledge base contains 
no definition for the population it is applicable to. 
Spiegelhalter and Knill-Jones [49] discuss the issue of 
transportability of statistical knowledge bases, con­
cluding that it remains a serious problem. A greater 
difficulty, in our view, is the limitation it imposes 
on the scope of any such knowledge base. Suppose 
we wished to extend NESTOR's domain by includ­
ing medical knowledge from another program work­
ing in a neighboring or overlapping clinical area. 
Patil's ABEL [35], for example, models disorders of 
electrolytes other than calcium, and considers more 
deeply the acid/base issues relevant to hypercal­
cemia. In broadening the domain, we have no idea 
which parts of the hypercalcemia model remain valid 
and which must be changed in light of the modified 
population and new interacting variables. Although 
the same is strictly true of ABEL's knowledge-we 
cannot be certain that the electrolyte model is still 
correct when calcium is considered explicitly-the 
causal link structure of ABEL is more robust than 
the precise statistical relationships. 
The robustness of causal links rests partly in their 
imprecision (weaker statements hold in more con­
texts and are therefore more modular), but also in 
that they capture a critical aspect of the domain 
knowledge. A causal model with a surface represen­
tation reflecting a theory or set of organizing princi­
ples underlying the domain should be less sensitive 
to context than an arbitrary selection of observed 
relationships among variables. 
3.3 Multiple Knowledge Sources 
The majority of knowledge-based computer pro­
grams are modeled not on single human experts but 
on expertise gleaned from multiple sources. A ver-
satile robot physician should (like its human coun­
terpart) include knowledge based on several human 
experts, as well as medical texts, journal articles, 
databases, and observed clinical results. 
Unfortunately, a knowledge engineer has no avail­
able standard for combining knowledge from these 
disparate sources into a single coherent belief model. 
In fact, even if each of the individual sources were 
stated in terms of consistent Bayesian decision mod­
els, there is no accepted normative procedure for de­
riving a Bayesian model from their combination [15). 
Furthermore, there is little reason to believe that a 
purely calculus-based algorithm could be developed 
because an effective combination procedure would 
need to take into account the strengths and weak­
nesses of each knowledge source, as well as the nature 
of disagreements among the sources. 
4 Decision Calculus as Object 
Language 
Some may still object that our separation of the sec­
ondary tasks from the primary decision is artificial. 
For example, the problem of the colleague present­
ing knowledge to the physician can be framed in 
decision-theoretic terms: select the fraction, level of 
abstraction, and presentation of the knowledge that 
would be of maximum utility to the physician. The­
oretically, it is possible to reformulate each task as 
a decision problem, here by treating communication 
acts as decision options. However, we find this solu­
tion unsatisfactory for two main reasons: 
• Viewing these tasks as decision problems fails to 
take advantage of their special structure. 
• The resulting decision problem overwhelms our 
practical model-building capabilities. 
This latter point summarizes the lesson we draw from 
our analysis of knowledge engineering issues in Sec­
tion 3. 
An approach we have implicitly advocated else­
where in this paper takes the uncertainty calculus 
as part of an object language to be reasoned about 
by the decision-making computer program. Asser­
tions stated in terms of calculus elements (in partic­
ular, probabilities) are derived from the knowledge 
base, which need not encode facts directly in that 
form. To choose a plan of action, the program con­
structs a decision model founded on the formal calcu­
lus. Calculus-based representations may or may not 
play a role in structures employed to support rea-
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soning tasks surrounding the primary decision, for 
example, user models built to aid communication. 
This position has been expressed by previous AI 
researchers. Even in pronouncing probability "epis­
temologically inadequate," McCarthy and Hayes ac­
knowledge that "the formalism will eventually have 
to allow statements about the probabilities of events" 
(emphasis added) [33, page 490). More recently, 
Grosof has provided a first-order-logic formulation 
treating probabilistic statements as terms within a 
meta-language [18,19). 
In the remainder of this paper we develop this 
solution approach, taking the object language to 
be Bayesian decision theory. As suggested in Sec­
tion 2.1, once the calculus is restricted to this role the 
case for decision-theoretic semantics becomes com­
pelling. Motivations for introducing variant calculi 
are reduced because secondary tasks and knowledge 
engineering issues are addressed by extra-calculitic 
mechanisms. In this context, general arguments 
for probability [6,24) as well as specific criticisms of 
alternate calculi (MYCIN certainty factors [22) and 
fuzzy probability [7,14), for example) are difficult to 
refute. 
5 Incomplete Decision Models 
A direct implementation of the decision-calculus-as­
object-language approach may be feasible-if we re­
lax the strict requirement that decision models be 
complete in the Bayesian sense of full specification 
of probabilities and utilities.4 Indeed, many uncer­
tainty mechanisms offered in the literature highlight 
incompleteness as a feature: D-S belief functions [41), 
Cooper's NESTOR [10), and Good's lower probabili­
ties [16), to name but a few. While incompleteness is 
not a panacea, we will see that allowing partial mod­
els may offer substantial advantages with respect to 
each of the reasoning tasks and knowledge engineer­
ing issues described above. 
5.1 Incompleteness and Evidential 
Structure 
One of the most-cited virtues of uncertainty calculi 
that admit incompleteness is that they allow the rep-
4 "Completeness" as used here is only defined with respect 
to a particular space of designated events. A model complete 
for a coarse-grained event space may be incomplete for a more 
refined space or for one defined by overlapping propositions. 
The incompleteness we are interested in permits the problem­
solver to refer to events for which probability distributions are 
unavailable. 
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resentation to express ignorance about the proposi­
tions in question. Although in Section 5.2 we dis­
pute the claim that incompleteness straightforwardly 
captures ignorance, allowing decision models to be 
incomplete does facilitate the expression of eviden­
tial structure and model derivation (that is, source 
of beliefs )-necessary preludes to any representation 
of "ignorance." Ignorance aside, these are precisely 
the sorts of knowledge irrelevant for one-shot deci­
sions yet indispensable for the surrounding reasoning 
tasks. 
That belief functions offer advantages in repre­
senting evidential structure is the keystone of the 
case for the Dempster-Shafer uncertainty calculus. 
In pleading the case, Shafer relates a model for ev­
idence acquisition as receiving a sequence of noisy 
messages asserting that the true state of nature lies 
in various hypothesis sets [43]. For some environ­
ments, this model appears to correspond well to ac­
tual information-gathering processes. In the applica­
tion of Lowrance et al. [32], for example, information 
input is of the form "the ship location is in the set 
A." Other applications of the D-S calculus stretch 
the interpretation of Shafer's evidence model some­
what beyond its elasticity. Lemmer [31] argues that 
the use of statistically derived data is inconsistent 
with this formulation, thereby invalidating numer­
ous applications in the literature. 
A belief function represents evidence structure by 
distinguishing knowledge based on a single piece of 
evidence supporting A= { a1, ... , an} from an equiv­
alent (in the Bayesian sense) belief state based on n 
weaker pieces of evidence supporting the individual 
ais. But arguments that this is a good representa­
tion for evidential structure must ultimately be set­
tled on empirical grounds, as Shafer points out [42, 
page 15]. Connections of evidence to sets of hypothe­
ses is only one component of evidential structure­
other features of evidence patterns not captured in 
the D-S belief function decomposition would surely 
be useful as well. For example, incompleteness aris­
ing from logical combinations of propositions in Nils­
son's probabilistic logic [34) might be viewed as a 
representation of the "boolean pattern" of evidence. 
There is no a priori reason to think that a single un­
certainty calculus-D-S belief functions or one yet to 
be invented-can provide a universally appropriate 
means for expressing evidential structure. 
The issue of evidential structure representation 
can and should be divorced from degree-of-belief as­
pects of a calculus. Evidence structuring mecha­
nisms inspired by the D-S approach are generally im­
plementable within other formalisms. For example, 
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Pearl [36] was able to achieve many of the benefits of 
Gordon and Shortliffe's hierarchical D-S scheme [17] 
with a Bayesian mechanism.5 And other models of 
evidence may be better suited for a Bayesian treat­
ment than one based on belief functions. 
Currently, there is little empirical support for the 
effectiveness of D-S or any other particular mecha­
nism for representing evidential structure. We also 
lack, for that matter, strong demonstrations of the 
benefits of evidence structure representation for un­
certain reasoning tasks. But despite the lamentable 
dearth of concrete experience, an examination of the 
tasks themselves suggests that evidence structure is 
one of the components of a good uncertainty repre­
sentation, and that incompleteness can play a sup­
porting role in capturing this structure. 
5.2 Incompleteness, Reasoning Tasks, 
and Knowledge Engineering 
A close look at the reasoning tasks and knowledge 
engineering issues discussed in Sections 2 and 3 re­
veais that many of the reasoning problems identified 
are aggravated substantially by the requirement of 
completeness for decision models. Some brief exam­
ples: 
• Information Gathering. The prospect of receiv­
ing additional data, facts, and advice pertain­
ing to the decision problem entails major ex­
pansions to any complete Bayesian belief model. 
Although structural regularities such as condi­
tional independence conditions may be exploited 
to reduce the assessment task, construction of 
complete models for all but the most narrow de­
cision contexts is likely to be intractable. 
• Communication. The common approaches to 
explanation exploit the structure of evidence 
leading the program to its conclusions. If the 
uncertainty representations that best capture 
evidential structure happen to be incomplete 
decision models, insisting on completeness de­
grades the program's explanatory ability. 
• Model Construction. Model construction from a 
modular knowledge base is largely an assembly 
5Pearl interprets the relation of evidence to a set of hy­
potheses S as an assertion of conditional independence be­
tween the evidence and subsets of S given S. Because his 
algorithm performs complete propagation based on this asser­
tion, the representation does not explicitly maintain incom­
pleteness and therefore cannot reconstruct the evidence pat­
tem. However, as Pearl notes, the propagation steps could be 
postponed with appropriate bookkeeping, thereby providing 
the desired evidence feature. 
task: piecing together a decision model from dis­
tributed fragments. In this decentralized frame­
work, it is difficult to ensure that the result­
ing assembly is complete and consistent. A col­
lection of submodels, each complete in isolation 
may underspecify the situation in combination. 
• Knowledge Modification Incomplete models pos­
sess a modularity advantage over complete mod­
els for the simple reason that weak statements 
hold in a wider variety of contexts than strong 
ones. 
• ·Multiple Knowledge Sources. As noted above, 
when a knowledge base is derived from a group 
of experts or a combination of sources, there is 
no accepted normative procedure for integrat­
ing the opinions and judgments into a single 
Bayesian decision model [15). 
Two main points arise from our survey of incom­
pleteness and its relation to evidential structure, rea­
soning tasks, and knowledge engineering. 
First, the benefits of permitting incompleteness 
in decision models are substantial across the board. 
Though these benefits are intangible (or at least diffi­
cult to quantify within the decision formalism itself) 
and subject to debate, they cannot be dismissed as 
negligible or irrelevant. In the sense that any model 
can only approximate reality [47), true completeness 
is an unattainable standard anyway. Those con­
cerned with indecisiveness resulting from incomplete 
models should be persuaded to examine the tradeoff 
more closely, as we shall in Section 6. 
Second, the diversity of uses for incompleteness 
suggests that a calculus oriented toward a single form 
of incomplete model cannot be ideal. Instead, the 
calculus is better treated as a decision model object 
language with a variety of structural constructs for 
expressing the incompleteness. It is reasonable to 
expect that different representation schemes will be 
best suited to the various tasks. 
A corollary to this second point is that simple in­
terpretations of the amount of incompleteness can­
not be correct. Without knowing the reason for the 
lack of full model specification (modularity consid­
erations, limited modeling resources, or other possi­
bilities suggested above), one cannot maintain that 
a measure of incompleteness expresses "ignorance" 
or any other particular quality. Ignorance and in­
completeness are two separate issues and should be 
strictly distinguished. Failure to do so is a prime 
source of common misconceptions about uncertainty 
calculi. 
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6 Making Decisions from In­
complete Models 
In allowing incompleteness we sacrifice guaranteed 
decisiveness in our decision models. Many ap­
proaches to decision making in underdetermined sit­
uations have been proposed over the years; we briefly 
review some of them in this section. Our intent is to 
provide a sense of the options available rather than 
to endorse a particular technique. 
Complete the Model 
One category of techniques comprises those that 
transform the incomplete model into a complete one 
by filling in the gaps. The method receiving the 
most theoretical and practical attention is to choose 
the complete probability model maximizing entropy 
among those consistent with the incomplete model 
provided [26]. Grosof [19] demonstrates that this 
and other "gap-filling" approaches are forms of non­
monotonic reasoning about statements in the uncer­
tainty calculus. 
Heuristic Decision Rules 
Methods within a second category generate decisions 
directly from incomplete models. Though lacking 
normative justification, these techniques can be com­
putational bargains. The prototypical decision rule 
for incomplete models is the minimax loss criterion 
studied in statistics [2]. Methods based on structural 
properties of the evidence and arguments salient to 
the decision, such as Cohen's endorsement theory [9], 
are also examples of this category. 
Further Computation and Assessment 
The third approach is based on a premise that fur­
ther computation and/or assessment can eventually 
achieve decisiveness. To converge on a decision, com­
putation may be directed toward either refinement 
of the decision model or dominance-proving activ­
ities. Decision model refinement falls within the 
model construction task we discussed in Section 3.1. 
Dominance-proving involves computational manipu­
lations of the incomplete decision model aimed at 
defining the set of admissible strategies. 
Little research effort has been expended to date 
on architectures and languages for general-purpose 
decision proving, although numerous techniques ap­
plicable to special cases have been developed [13, 
21,51,53]. The variety of dominance-proving strate­
gies available seems to indicate that several different 
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forms of incompleteness must be accommodated; un­
doubtedly many of these will be unlike the kinds of 
incompleteness useful for capturing evidential struc­
ture. 
Decision Making: Discussion 
The far-from-exhaustive review above suggests that a 
variety of remedies are available for indecisiveness in­
duced by incompleteness in decision models. All are 
oriented towards quantitative incompleteness; miss­
ing strategies, events, or other structural model fea­
tu:t:es are not addressed. 
In addition, each of the methods has its own limi­
tations pertaining to the forms of incomplete models 
they accommodate and the reasons for incomplete­
ness on which they are justified. Comparisons among 
them must be performed on empirical grounds, or 
theoretically within a specific framework for incom­
pleteness. The best decision-making policy for any 
practical program probably consists of a mixture of 
the above and other approaches. Assessment of the 
costs and benefits of each method for the types of 
incomplete models they are to be applied to should 
be used to determine which method or combination 
is most appropriate for the particular task at hand. 
7 Conclusion 
Our observations over the preceding sections lead us 
to a series of methodological conclusions for the de­
velopment of uncertain reasoning mechanisms. 
1. Uncertainty representations sufficient for one­
shot decision-making may be inadequate for the 
larger reasoning problem that encompasses sup­
porting tasks such as information-gathering and 
communication. 
2. The variety of knowledge engineering concerns 
makes it unlikely that incremental extensions to 
an existing calculus will offer benefits for a sig­
nificant fraction of them. 
3. Approaches that reason about the elements 
of a calculus place the burden of supporting 
the various reasoning tasks on extra-calculitic 
mechanisms. Once the responsibility is thus 
transferred, the case for a calculus derived 
from Bayesian decision theory is considerably 
strengthened. 
4. Numerous engineering objectives are served by 
permitting incomplete decision models in the 
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underlying representation. However, this mul­
tiplicity of objectives also requires that many 
forms and interpretations of incompleteness be 
accommodated. Again, no "calculus" will suf­
fice. 
5. Although the possibility of indecisiveness is 
an unavoidable by-product of incompleteness, 
many computational courses are open to pro­
grams faced with such situations. Further re­
search in this area appears promising. 
In this essay, we have tried to unify a growing body 
of research that implicitly or explicitly treats the de­
cision calculus as an object language manipulated 
by higher-order mechanisms for uncertain reasoning. 
Those who would invent calculi to directly address 
some of the knowledge engineering issues are asking 
too much from such a limited class of representation 
mechanisms. A more reasonable role for uncertainty 
calculi in knowledge-based computer programs is to 
provide a grounding in decision theory, thereby offer­
ing a semblance of normative status to the decisions 
made by these programs. 
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